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Abstract
We study eﬀects of direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) in a mar-
ket with two pharmaceutical ﬁrms providing horizontally diﬀerentiated
(branded) drugs. Patients varying in their susceptability to medication
are a priori uninformed of available medication. Physicians making
the prescription choice perfectly identify a patient’s most suitable drug.
Firms promote drugs to physicians (detailing) to inﬂuence prescription
decisions and, if allowed, to consumers (DTCA) to increase the aware-
n e s so ft h ed r u g . T h em a i nﬁndings are: Firstly, ﬁrms beneﬁtf r o m
DTCA only if prices are regulated. On the one hand, DTCA reduces
the physicians’ market power and thus detailing expenses, while, on the
other, it triggers price competition as a larger share of patients are aware
of the alternatives. Secondly, under price regulation DTCA is welfare
improving as long as the regulated price is not too high. Under price
competition, DTCA is harmful to welfare unless detailing is wasteful
and the drugs are poor substitutes.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The pharmaceutical industry is one of the most advertising-intensive industries
(see e.g. Scherer and Ross, 1990). Promotional expenditures often amount to
20-30 percent of sales, sometimes even exceeding expenditures on R&D.1 How-
ever, contrary to most other industries the vast amount of promotional spend-
ings are not targeted at the consumers, but rather at the physicians making
the prescriptions. While this can be explained by the important role of the
physician as the patient’s agent, another important reason lies with the reg-
ulatory restrictions on direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) of prescription
d r u g st h a ta r ep r e s e n ti nm o s tc o u n t r i e s .
Recently, however, there has been a trend towards a more liberal legislation
on DTCA. In the US, the Food and Drug Administration issued new guidelines
in 1997 for broadcast advertising of prescription drugs directly to consumers,
facilitating the use of television for DTCA. A similar liberalisation is carried
through in New Zealand. In the European Union a 5-year pilot project of
allowing DTCA for three long-term and chronic diseases - diabetes, AIDS and
asthma - has recently been proposed.
The role of DTCA has generated a controversial debate (see e.g. Wilkes et
al., 2000). Opponents claim that DTCA causes physicians to waste valuable
time during encounters with patients and encourages the use of expensive and
sometimes unnecessary medications. Proponents argue that DTCA increases
the consumers’ awareness and knowledge about available medical treatments,
and this may enable them to detect a possible disease at an earlier stage and
more actively take part in the decision of which drug to prescribe.
The debate on DTCA seems to ignore that pharmaceutical companies al-
ready spend tremendous amounts of money on promotion aimed at inﬂuencing
the physicians’ prescription choices in ways favourable to the companies.2 In
this paper, we therefore seek to contribute to the debate by investigating the in-
teraction between advertising directed at consumers (DTCA), on the one hand,
and promotional activities targeted at physicians (detailing), on the other. In
particular, the following three questions will be addressed: (i) How does avail-
ability of DTCA aﬀect the pharmaceutical ﬁrms’ incentives to spend resources
on detailing, and, eventually, the physician’s prescription choices? (ii) Does
DTCA have a pro-competitive or an anti-competitive eﬀect on drug prices and
1According to Schweitzer (1997) the marketing expenses for three of the largest US phar-
maceutical companies - Merck, Pﬁzer, and Eli Lilly - ranged from 21 to 40% of annual sales,
while the R&D expenses varied between 11 and 15%. Similar ﬁgures are reported from
Novartis and Aventis, the largest pharmaceutical companies in Europe. See also Hurwitz
and Caves (1988) for US data or Zweifel and Breyer (1997) for ﬁgures in Germany and
Switzerland.
2Rosenthal et al. (2002) report spendings on promotion to professionals in the US to
13,241 millions of dollars in 2000.
2proﬁts in the industry? (iii) Is DTCA beneﬁcial or detrimental from a welfare
point of view?
We will apply the following theoretical framework. We consider a market
for prescription drugs, in which a Health Authority (e.g. the FDA) decides on
whether or not to allow DTCA. We consider both a regime of price regulation
and the case where prices are set by the pharmaceutical ﬁrms. This enables
us to compare the eﬀects of DTCA across health care systems in which ﬁrms
compete on price (e.g. in the US or Germany) and systems in which prices are
regulated (e.g. in the UK or the Scandinavian countries).3
There are two pharmaceutical ﬁrms in the market providing horizontally
diﬀerentiated drugs. Applying the familiar Hotelling model, this is captured
by assuming the ﬁrms (or drugs) to be located at either end of the unit in-
terval. This means that we focus on branded vs. branded competition in the
prescription drug market, and not on branded vs. generic competition. Thus,
we have in mind competition between medications based on diﬀerent chemical
entities treating a particular disease. There is evidence that most illnesses can
be treated by a variety of medications, and that many drugs meet competition
from chemically diﬀerentiated substitutes even under patent protection.4
We assume that patients diﬀer in their susceptibility towards the diﬀerent
drugs, as represented by their location on the Hotelling-line. This means that
some patients are better oﬀ w i t h ,s a y ,d r u g1 ,w h i l eo t h e r sa r eb e t t e ro ﬀ with
the alternative drug. Thus, there is no strict hierarchy in which one drug is
universally better than another, implying that optimal treatment depends on
the individual case and is a matter of matching. As the patients are initially
unaware of the relevant medication available, they visit a physician who has
the appropriate skills and knowledge to identify the optimal match for each
patient.5
The pharmaceutical companies attempt to bias prescription choices toward
their own brand by promoting it to the physician. The marketing activities are
personal and targeted as they mainly involve pharmaceutical sales agents pro-
viding information on a particular drug in a face-to-face meeting with the physi-
cian. These agents also invite physicians to sponsored conference trips, provide
3Most European countries exercise some form of price regulation on prescription drugs.
See e.g. Mossialos (1998) for an overview of the diﬀerent ways drug prices are regulated in
Europe.
4Scherer (2000) reports that the number of drugs per symptom group ranged from 1 to
50, with a median of 5 drugs and mean of 6.04. Lu and Comanor (1998) ﬁnd that all but
13 of 148 new branded chemical entities introduced in the US between 1978-87 had at least
one fairly close substitute; the average number of substitutes being 1.86.
5Note that the issue of over-utilisation of prescription drugs is not addressed in the paper.
Although, this could be included, for instance, by assuming a fraction of the patients not
in need for any of the available drugs, the model is most suitable to analyse the matching
problem.
3free product samples, etc. We therefore consider it reasonable to assume that
detailing gives rise to an agency problem as the physician may be more in-
clined to prescribe the most heavily promoted drug to a patient rather than
a more suitable alternative that experiences less promotion.6 Consequently,
some patients may face a utility loss in receiving a suboptimal prescription.
An important feature of detailing activities is that they are not a direct
reward to the physician for the prescription. Instead this is eﬀo r tt h a ti s
irreversibly spent (sunk) by the pharmaceutical companies at the time the
physician makes the decision about which drug to prescribe. For instance, a
physician that has received a sponsored trip to a conference may, but need
not, prescribe this company’s product. However, detailing may still inﬂuence
the physician’s inclination to prescribe the company’s drug, otherwise these
spendings would not take place. This makes it reasonable to describe detailing
competition as a marketing contest, where the ﬁrm spending more resources
on detailing faces a higher probability that the physician will prescribe its own
rather than the competing brand.7
Firms may also advertise their drugs directly to consumers, if this is per-
mitted by the Health Authority. Contrary to promotion to physicians, DTCA
is mainly impersonal and provided through mass media (e.g. television or print
medias). As patients are ap r i o r iuninformed about the available medication,
the ﬁrms must convey some information about their drugs to the patients via
their advertising campaigns.8 To capture these features, we employ the adver-
tising model of Grossman and Shapiro (1984), in the duopoly variant, where
advertising increases the fraction of patients aware of a particular product. We
ﬁnd it reasonable that patients’ information about available medication lim-
its the physician’s ability or inclination to prescribe a less suitable (”wrong”)
drug. There may be several reasons for this, like the risk of being subject to
liability suits or loosing reputation. Professional ethics may also restrain the
physician from actively recommending a less suitable drug to a patient aware
of the alternatives.
6In the context of branded vs. branded competition, Rizzo (1999) provides evidence that
detailing eﬀort makes demand less elastic to prices, indicating a persuasive nature of such
activities. Hurwitz and Caves (1988) provide similar evidence in the context of branded vs.
generic competition. See also Hellerstein (1998).
7In the context of promotional competition, Schmalensee (1976, 1992) uses a similar
approach to determine ﬁrms’ market shares as a function of advertising. In a related paper,
Konrad (2002) also models promotion aimed at physicians as a marketing contest.
8There are also regulatory restrictions on the content of DTCA of prescription drugs. In
general, advertisements should include information relating to side eﬀects, contraindications,
and eﬀectiveness as reported on the packages. Concerning broadcasting advertising of pre-
scription drugs, the FDA in the US issued guidelines in 1997 stating that these requirements
could be satisﬁed by referring the patient to further sources of information: their doctor, a
web-site, a charge-free phone number, and a print advertisemement (see e.g. Wilkes et al.,
2000).
4Within this framework, the paper provides the following answers to the
three questions raised previously. Firstly, we ﬁnd that the two diﬀerent market-
ing strategies, DTCA and detailing, are substitutes, rather than complements,
for the ﬁrms in achieving higher proﬁts. Firms’ incentive to advertise directly
to consumers is to reduce the physicians’ market power and by this to soften
detailing competition. Thus, ﬁrms respond to a relaxation of the restrictions
on DTCA by lowering their detailing eﬀort.9
Secondly, emphasising the diﬀerent nature of DTCA and detailing, we ﬁnd
that the two marketing strategies have a distinctly diﬀerent eﬀect on competi-
tion between the pharmaceutical ﬁrms. Consistent with the empirical literature
in the context of branded vs. branded competition (e.g. Rizzo, 1999, King,
2000), detailing tends to reduce the price elasticity of demand, implying an
anticompetitive eﬀect. However, there is a direct loss involved with detailing
as the ﬁrms have to transfer resources to the physician. DTCA reduces the
physician’s inﬂuence over demand and, thereby, allows ﬁrms to contain their
total promotional outlays. However, by increasing the price elasticity of de-
mand, DTCA also triggers price competition, similar to Grossman and Shapiro
(1984). Overall, we ﬁnd the pro-competitive eﬀe c tt ob ed o m i n a n ts ot h a tt h e
availability of DTCA curbs proﬁts when prices are not regulated. When prices
are set by the Health Authority, the price eﬀect vanishes and ﬁrms now beneﬁt
from a removal of a ban on DTCA.
Thirdly, we ﬁnd that DTCA improves welfare under price regulation as
long as the regulated price is not too high. Here, the costs of DTCA are more
than oﬀset by the beneﬁt sd u et oi m p r o v e dm a t c h i n go fd r u g st op a t i e n t sa n d
lower spendings on detailing. However, when the regulated price is high, e.g.
for the purpose of stimulating R&D, ﬁrms tend to provide excessive levels of
DTCA, making a ban on DTCA desirable. Under price competition, over-
provision of DTCA arises if the social cost of detailing is not too high and
when drugs are poor substitutes. This is because product prices are high when
the brands are poor substitutes, and intense promotional competition arises.
Despite the presence of over-provision, the high mismatch cost in the case of
poor substitutability usually does not justify a ban on DTCA in this case.
Although the (empirical) literature on marketing in the pharmaceutical
industry is quite extensive (see e.g. Scherer, 2000, for a review), most of the
literature has considered how promotion of branded drugs (to physicians) may
deter entry of generic drugs (e.g. Frank and Salkever, 1997, and Scott Morton,
2000). There are some studies considering competition between branded drugs,
9Rosenthal et al. (2002) present ﬁgures from the US market showing that both DTCA
and promotion to professionals have increased in absolute numbers for the periode 1996-2000.
However, in percentage of sales, total promotional eﬀorts have been constant and the ﬁgures
indicate a substitution eﬀect from detailing towards DTCA, though DTCA still constitutes
a relatively small share of total sales (2.2%) and total promotional spendings (16%).
5providing evidence that detailing eﬀort tends to make demand less elastic to
prices and thus may have an anticompetitive eﬀect (e.g. Rizzo, 1999, and King,
2000), but the eﬀect of DTCA is not addressed.
The two papers closest to ours are Rubin and Schrag (1999) and Konrad
(2002). The former considers the eﬀe c to fD T C Ao nt h ep r o v i s i o no fd r u g sb y
HMOs’ to their patients. As payments are prospective and patients are unin-
formed about available medication, the HMOs’ have an incentive to provide
cheaper and, perhaps, less eﬀective drugs. Assuming a more eﬀective drug
being supplied by a monopolist and a less eﬀective drug supplied by a compet-
itive market, Rubin and Schrag (1999) show that the monopolist can mitigate
this agency problem by using DTCA to inform patients about its product. De-
spite the similarities, they do not consider competition in terms of advertising
and prices, and they are not concerned about the role of detailing eﬀort on
physician’s prescription choice, which are the main issues of our paper.
Similar to us, Konrad (2002) is concerned about how promotional eﬀort tar-
geted at a physician may distort the prescription choice and potentially impose
a utility loss on patients due to mismatching. Although Konrad (2002) also
models detailing competition as a marketing contest, the framework is diﬀerent
in that he is concerned about asymmetry between ﬁrms and diﬀerent types of
promotion to physician (detailing eﬀort and ”pseudo” research studies), but
does not deal with the interaction between detailing and DTCA.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, the basic ana-
lytical framework is described. In section 3 and 4, we derive the equilibrium
outcomes for a price regulation regime and a price competition regime, re-
spectively. Section 5 is devoted to analyse the welfare implications of DTCA.
Section 6 concludes.
2M o d e l
Assume the market for prescription drugs consists of a continuum of patients
distributed uniformly on the line segment [0,1] with mass 1.I n t h e m a r k e t
there are two pharmaceutical ﬁrms, indexed by i =0 ,1, located at either end
o ft h eu n i ti n t e r v a l .F i r mi sells the branded drug i at a uniform price pi.E a c h
patient is in need of one unit of drug 0 or 1. The surplus (utility) derived by
a patient located at x ∈ [0,1] from getting a unit of drug i is
Ux,i = v − t|x − i| − pi, (1)
where v>0 and t>0. We assume that the gross utility, v,i sa l w a y sl a r g e
enough for the whole market to be covered. Patients are heterogeneous with
respect to their susceptibility to treatment with the two branded drugs. The
parameter t captures the utility loss (”transportation cost”) per unit distance
between the product in question and a patient’s ideal or most suitable drug.
The ﬁrst two terms in (1) can be interpreted as a measure of the eﬀectiveness
6of drug i for a patient located at x,w h e r et h et e r mt|x − i| can be thought of
as potential side-eﬀects depending on the degree of mismatch between patient
x and drug i.
Note that in (1) patients cover the full price of the drugs purchased. In
practice, patients often bear some ﬁxed proportion of the price of prescription
drugs due to insurance. However, the model and the subsequent analysis will
not change qualitatively by introducing a copayment on the prices.10 Further-
more, in the price regulation regime (cf. section 3) prices do not aﬀect the
allocation of drugs to patients, capturing the case of patients being insensitive
to relative prices.
Patients are ap r i o r iuninformed of their diagnosis and relevant medication,
and seek medical advice by a physician. The physician has the skills to perfectly
observe a patient’s disease and to identify the most suitable medical treatment.
Based on (1) a physician would prescribe drug 0 to a patient located at x if11
v − tx − p0 ≥ v − t(1 − x) − p1. (2)
Let b x deﬁne the patient who is equally well oﬀ by consuming either drug. From
(2), the location of the marginal patient is given by
b x =
p1 − p0 + t
2t
. (3)
If a physician bases her choice of prescription drug solely on patient character-
istics, she would prescribe drug 0 to every patient located to the left of b x, i.e.
in the interval [0,b x], and drug 1 to the residual share of patients.
However, pharmaceutical ﬁrms spend substantial eﬀorts in promoting drugs
to physicians aiming at aﬀecting their prescription choices in favour of the ﬁrm.
In the following we will refer to these marketing activities as detailing.12 Im-
portantly, detailing is not a direct (monetary) reward for the prescription. The
promotional eﬀort is already sunk when the physician makes the decision about
which drug to prescribe. Instead, detailing is typically an in-kind transfer from
a drug producer that increases the likelihood that the physician will prescribe
10Let τ denote the copayment rate. Then the function in (3) can be written as b x =
τ(p1−p0)+t
2t . Rearranging this yields b x =
p1−p0+e t
2e t , where e t = t/τ, which implies just a
reinterpretation of t.
11One could question the role of the prices in the physician’s prescription choice. How-
ever, there is empirical evidence that physicians do care about patients’ expenditures when
deciding which drug to prescribe (Lundin, 2000). Moreover, Rizzo (1999) estimates that in
absence of detailing eﬀort demand responds quite elastically to changes in prices. In any
instance, section 3 will capture the case where prices do not matter for the prescription
choice.
12We acknowledge that in many instances detailing may also play an important informative
role. In our model, we focus on the persuasive aspect of promotion.
7this producer’s drug rather than a competing brand.13 In line with this, we
assume that ﬁrm i chooses the amount of detailing, ϕi, which is irreversibly
spent before the physician makes her decision about which drug to prescribe.
Applying the standard Tullock model of rent seeking, we let the probability
that ﬁrm i convinces the physician to prescribe its product be given by the





We see that the probability that the physician prescribe the branded drug i is
increasing in ﬁrm i’s detailing eﬀort but decreasing in ﬁrm j’s detailing eﬀort.
Thus, the ﬁrm that is able to commit to a higher level of detailing faces a higher
probability that a physician will prescribe its product. Note that Schmalensee
(1976, 1992) uses the parametric form given by (4) to determine ﬁrms’ market
shares as a function of advertising in the context of promotional competition.15
If allowed by the Health Authority, ﬁrms may also spend resources on direct-
to-consumer advertising (DTCA). Since patients are initially uninformed about
available medication of their disease, we ﬁnd it reasonable that this type of
advertising must convey some (product-speciﬁc) information to the patients,
at least the product’s existence. Employing the informative advertising model
of Grossman and Shapiro (1984), thou g hi nt h ed u o p o l yv a r i a n t ,w el e tΦi
denote the fraction of patients receiving an ad from ﬁrm i.T h eﬁrms cannot
target advertising at each individual patient, implying that every patient has
an equal chance of receiving a given ad. This is consistent with DTCA typically
being provided by mass media, like television, newspapers, etc.
We let ﬁrm i’s cost of reaching a fraction Φi o ft h ep a t i e n t sb eg i v e nb y
A(Φi),w h e r eA0 > 0 and A00 > 0. For analytical purposes, we will in the fol-
lowing assume that A(Φi)=aΦ2
i/2, with a maximum advertising expenditure
of a/2.16 Thus, it becomes increasingly costly for the ﬁrms to reach a greater
13We do not distinguish between whether a physician deliberately or unconsciously alters
her prescription choice when being exposed to detailing. The former case refers to a selﬁsh
physician who consciously prescribes the promoted drug for the reason of receiving future
beneﬁts from the drug producer. The latter case refers to a physician who prescribes the
promoted drug for reasons such as guilt or emotional attachment built up with a relationship
to sales agents, sponsored conference trips, etc.; or simply out of idleness.
14This contest success function has been suggested by Tullock (1980). It is a special case
of a more general contest success function, but has gained support by an axiomatization in
Skaperdas (1996).
15Konrad (2002) also applies a contest approach to model how promotional competition
may aﬀect physician’s prescription choice.






The quadratic variant used in our paper has the same properties, but we have to impose a
lower bound on the parameter a to secure that Φi ≤ 1. For more details about the advertising
technology, see the mentioned literature.
8fraction of the population by DTCA.
The availability of DTCA divides the market into four possible segments:
(i) A fraction Φ0Φ1 of patients who are aware of both drugs, (ii) a frac-
tion Φ0 (1 − Φ1) of patients who are aware of only drug 0, (iii) a fraction
Φ1 (1 − Φ0) of patients who are aware only of drug 1, and, ﬁnally, (iv) a fraction
(1 − Φ0)(1− Φ1) of patients who have not received any ads and therefore re-
main uninformed about available medication even after ﬁrms’ advertising cam-
paigns. We assume that a health shock induces individuals to visit a physician
irrespective of their knowledge of the relevant medical treatments, and that
every patient receives medical treatment. At this point our model diverges
from Grossman and Shapiro (1984) in that also the uninformed fraction of
patients, i.e. (1 − Φ0)(1− Φ1), eventually demands one of the products.
We ﬁnd it reasonable that patients’ knowledge about relevant medication
aﬀects physicians’ prescription choice.17 Speciﬁcally, we assume that the physi-
cian’s scope to prescribe a promoted, but less suitable (”wrong”), drug is con-
strained by the patient’s information about the alternatives. In particular,
faced with a patient aware of his most suitable drug, we assume that a physi-
cian prescribes this particular drug. Otherwise, she will have to falsely claim
that the patient would be better oﬀ with the other (”wrong”) drug. We ﬁnd it
plausible that physicians will refrain from such actions. There may be several
reasons for this, for instance, the risk of facing litigation, professional ethics,
or a concern for loosing patients in the future.
To formalise the physicians’ prescription behaviour, let m denote the frac-
tion of patients informed about their most suitable drug, where m is given
by
m = Φ0b x + Φ1 (1 − b x). (5)
For this group of patients, physicians base their prescription choices on patient
characteristics, as described by (2) and (3). For the residual group of patients,
1 − m =( 1− Φ0)b x +( 1− Φ1)(1− b x),
physicians’ choice of prescription is assumed to be governed by ﬁrms’ detailing
eﬀort, as described in (4).
Finally, it seems reasonable that not every physician is receptive to detailing
in the sense that such activities distorts the prescription choice. Let q ∈ (0,1)
denote the share of physicians receptive to detailing eﬀort. Firms are assumed
to know the share q, but not an individual physician’s type. Normalising the
number of physicians in the population to one, the (expected) demand for drug
0 can be written as
D0 = q[Φ0b x + µ0 (1 − m)] + (1 − q)b x. (6)
17For instance, Lipsky and Taylor (1997) found that 71 percent of family physicians believe
that DTCA induces the physician to prescribe drugs that they would not ordinarily prescribe.
9An analogous expression describes the demand for drug 1. From (6) we see
that by spending resources on DTCA, ﬁrm 0 lowers the fraction of patients for
which it must contest by spending resources on detailing in order to convince
the physician to prescribe its product.
The pharmaceutical ﬁrms face identical and constant marginal production
costs, which we normalise to zero. The R&D costs are considered sunk at the
time marketing and price decisions are taking place, and play no role in the
analysis. Assuming ﬁrms to be risk neutral, ﬁrm i’s (expected) payoﬀ amounts
to
πi = piDi − aΦ
2
i/2 − ϕi. (7)
T h ef o l l o w i n gs e q u e n c eo fm o v e si sc o n s i d e r e d :
• Stage 1: The Health Authority decides on whether or not to allow DTCA.
• Stage 2: The pharmaceutical ﬁrms determine spendings on detailing, and,
if allowed, they set prices and the level of DTCA.
• Stage 3: The physician prescribes either drug 0 or 1 to the patients.
A su s u a l ,t h eg a m ei ss o l v e db yb a c k w a r di n d u c t i o n . 18
3 Marketing competition and regulated prices
Let us ﬁrst examine ﬁrms’ marketing strategies when price competition is ab-
sent. This corresponds to the situation present in most European countries,
where prices of prescription drugs are not unilaterally set by the pharmaceu-
tical companies but rather subject to some sort of governmental regulation.19
At the marketing stage (stage 2) ﬁr m st a k et h e s ep r i c e sa sg i v e n .F i r mi then
maximises (7) with respect to ϕi and Φi, taking into account the physicians’
prescription choice as described by (6). Restricting attention to the symmetric




















18One could argue that marketing is more of a long-term decision than price setting, and
should therefore be determined at a stage previous of the price game. As this only complicates
the analysis without providing any qualitatively diﬀerent results, we have decided to follow
Grossman and Shapiro (1984) by assuming marketing and price decisions to take place at
the same stage of the game.
19See e.g. Mossialos (1998) for an overview of the diﬀerent ways prescription drug prices
are regulated in Europe.
20The equilibrium is deﬁned for a>p
q
4.
10where the superscript r denotes that we consider the price regulation regime.
Under a ban on DTCA (i.e. Φr =0 ), we see from (9) that ﬁrms’ detailing
eﬀort depends only on the regulated price (p) and the fraction of physicians
receptive to detailing (q). Obviously, both a higher p and a higher q induce
the ﬁrms to spend more eﬀort on detailing.
However, the availability of DTCA may change the situation. As by (8),
the level of DTCA increases in the regulated price and falls in the cost of ad-
vertising. More interestingly, DTCA increases in q and has a negative impact
on detailing. The intuition is that by increasing patients awareness of their
product ﬁrms constrain the physicians’ market power related to the prescrip-
t i o nd e c i s i o n . T ot h i se x t e n t ,D T C As e r v e sa sam e a n st osoften detailing
competition.


















We see that ﬁrms’ proﬁts increase in the regulated price, but decrease in the
cost of advertising (a). A higher price triggers marketing competition in terms
of DTCA and possibly detailing, but the direct positive eﬀect on proﬁts is not
oﬀset by the increase in marketing expenditures. It can be shown that proﬁts
decrease in the fraction of physicians receptive to detailing.21 However, this
is not very surprising as a higher q increases spending on both detailing and
DTCA, as explained above.
Although DTCA lowers spendings on detailing, this is costly in itself.
Therefore, it is not clear whether DTCA contributes to higher or lower proﬁts
to the pharmaceutical ﬁrms. A comparison of the equilibrium outcomes yields
the following result.
Proposition 1 If prices are regulated, the availability of DTCA lowers detail-
ing eﬀort and increases proﬁts to the pharmaceutical ﬁrms.
Proof. >From (9) a ban on DTCA, i.e. Φr =0 , implies ϕr |Φr=0 = p
q
4.
Comparison with (9) immediately shows ϕr |Φr=0 ≥ ϕr. Inserting ϕr |Φr=0 into
(7) yields πr |Φr=0 =
p







which completes the proof.
The availability of another marketing strategy, i.e. DTCA, does not lead






16a < 0 for any a>p
q
4 (see footnote 20).
11ﬁrms actually beneﬁt from the availability of DTCA when prices are regulated.
This means that the expenditure on DTCA is more than oﬀset by the reduction
in detailing costs.
To fully understand the result, consider a ban on DTCA. In this case,
competition between the ﬁrms is a pure marketing contest. Firms spend eﬀort
on detailing in order to convince the physician to prescribe their product, with
the prize p · q attached to it, which each ﬁrm receives with probability 1/2.
The residual proﬁt, i.e.
p
2 · (1 − q), is related to the fraction of physicians not
receptive to detailing and thus not subject to competition. A substantial share
(half) of the ﬁrms’ proﬁt is dissipated in the marketing contest. This is a
standard result in the contest literature (see e.g. Hillman and Samet, 1987).
DTCA enables the ﬁrms to reduce the proﬁts subject to detailing competi-
tion by way of reducing the scope for physicians to prescribe promoted rather
than most suitable drugs to patients. From (7), we see that the (expected)
proﬁt related to detailing is reduced to
p
2 · q(1 − Φ), while the proﬁt not sub-
ject to detailing competition increases with
p
2 · (1 − q(1 − Φ)). This explains
why detailing eﬀort decreases and proﬁt increases when ﬁr m sh a v eD T C At o
their avail under price regulation.
4 Marketing and price competition
Let us now consider the case where the Health Authority allows the pharma-
ceutical ﬁrms to set the prices of their products. This situation is relevant for
some markets, such as the US and the German market. When prices are not
subject to regulation, the nature of the market game changes, and this makes
it intersting to examine the impact of price competition on ﬁrms’ marketing
strategies.
At stage two of the game, ﬁrm i now maximises (7) with respect to pi,Φi
and ϕi, taking into account the physicians’ prescription behaviour as described




















where the superscript (c) denotes that we consider the price competition regime.
Inspection of (11)-(13) reveal that DTCA not only aﬀects detailing but also
prices. In fact, we see from (11) that DTCA contributes to lower prices of
prescription drugs. In the extreme case, where every patient is aware of the
two drugs available, i.e. Φc → 1, the equilibrium price approaches the price
under full information, i.e. pc → t. The price is also aﬀected by the fraction
12of physicians receptive to detailing (q). Again, we see that as this fraction
becomes very low, i.e. q → 0, the price approaches the full information price.
The pro-competitive eﬀect on prices of advertising that conveys informa-
tion to the consumers is pointed out in a more general framework by Grossman
and Shapiro (1984). In our model, though, advertising has an additional ef-
fect, and that is to soften detailing competition. As explained above, DTCA
enables ﬁrms to curb the physicians’ market power by increasing the patients’
information about available medication.
The symmetric equilibrium is obtained by solving the set of equations (11)-











































3 − q + Ω










We can now establish the following result.
Proposition 2 If prices are not regulated, the availability of DTCA lowers
prices, detailing eﬀort and proﬁts to the pharmaceutical ﬁrms.
Proof. The equilibrium under a ban on DTCA is obtained by setting Φc =
0 in (11) and (12), yielding pc |Φc=0 = t







with (11) and (12) immediately shows pc |Φc=0 ≥ pc and ϕc |Φc=0 ≥ pc. Inserting

























22Equilibrium is deﬁned for 1 − q<Ω < 1+q, which is true for any a>qt
4.
13which is true since by assumption a>q t
4, implying that 1 − q<Ω < 1+q
(see footnote 22).
Thus, contrary to the price regulation regime, the opportunity of DTCA
now tends to reduce the pharmaceutical ﬁrms’ proﬁts. Although, DTCA lowers
detailing eﬀort, as in the previouse case, it also has an eﬀect on prices when
these are set by the ﬁrms rather than a Health Authority. As DTCA tends to
lower prices, both the price reduction and the increase in expenditures due to
DTCA more than oﬀsets the gain in detailing outlays.
The result is consistent with Grossman and Shapiro (1984) who proves this
to hold for a broad class of advertising technologies. In our model, though, ad-
vertising provides a beneﬁti nt h a ti tsoftens detailing competition by limiting
the physician’s inclination or ability to prescribe promoted drugs. However, as
in Grossman and Shapiro (1984), advertising proves to be a two-edged sword.
By spending more resources on DTCA, price competition is triggered. As the
price eﬀect more than oﬀsets savings due to lower detailing eﬀort, proﬁts fall
in the amount of DTCA, which explains why ﬁrms are better oﬀ with a ban on
DTCA. This result provides an example of a situation where it may be in the
interest of oligopolists to raise their own costs, here the advertising costs.23
5 Welfare implications
Let us now turn to stage one of the game and explore the following two ques-
tions: (i) Does the market provide an optimal level of DTCA? (ii) Is DTCA
welfare improving and should it therefore be allowed by the Health Authority?
Before proceeding, we should stress that we carry out a second-best analysis
by taking the presence of detailing as given. As detailing is the very source of
drug mismatch, one could argue that the mismatch problem, and by the same
token, the social role for DTCA would be eliminated if the Health Authority
could somehow ban the promotional role of detailing. For a variety of reasons,
this is not observed in practice and will, therefore, not be the focus of our
analysis.24
The welfare standard used here is the conventional one of consumer surplus
plus proﬁts, or alternatively the patients’ health beneﬁt less (marketing) costs.
23There is some empirical evidence that ﬁrms actually may beneﬁt from a ban on adver-
tising. For example, Eckard (1991) shows that cigarette manufacturers have beneﬁtted from
their exclusion from television advertising.
24One reason is that enforcing a ban on promotional spendings targeted at physicians is
likely to be excessively costly. As such promotional activities take various forms, ﬁrms can
easily neutralise a ban on any one activity by shifting to another. Moreover, it is diﬃcult
to diﬀerentiate between pure persuasion and the provision of information to the physician.
This clearly leads to a problem of veriﬁability and, thus, to an enforcement problem.
14Social welfare can be written as25
W = v − T − aΦ
2 − c · 2ϕ (18)
where c ∈ [0,1].T h e ﬁrst term is the patients’ gross beneﬁt of receiving
medical treatment. Since the number of patients is normalised to 1 and every
p a t i e n ti sp r e s c r i b e do n eo ft h ed r u g s ,t h et o t a lg r o s sb e n e ﬁti se q u a lt ov.T h e
second term represents the aggregate mismatching costs. These costs refer to
imperfect matching of prescription drugs to patients. The two last terms are
the industry’s outlays on DTCA and on detailing.
The parameter c measures the social cost associated with detailing. The
extreme case of c =1refers to a situation where detailing is considered as
pure social waste, which is a common approach in the rent seeking or contest
literature (see e.g. Tullock, 1980). On the other hand, if c =0 ,d e t a i l i n gi s
considered a welfare-neutral transfer from the pharmaceutical companies to the
physicians. In this case, one dollar at the physicians’ or the pharmaceutical
ﬁrms’ hand has an equal value from a welfare point of view.
To calculate the total mismatching cost T, we partition the patients into
groups depending on their knowledge about available medication and on whether
or not they have visited a physician receptive to detailing eﬀort. We can write
the total mismatch costs as follows















(1 + q(1 − Φ)). (19)
The ﬁrst term is the fraction of patients that have visited a physician whose
prescription choice is not inﬂuence by detailing (i.e. 1 − q). As this group is
prescribed their most suitable drug they face an average mismatch cost of t/4.
For the residual fraction (i.e. q), mismatch costs depend on the patients’ infor-
mation. Facing patients aware of their most suitable drug, i.e. m (cf. (5)), the
average mismatch cost is t/4 as physicians refrain from actively recommending
a less suitable (”wrong”) drug in this case. Finally, for the group of patients
uninformed about their most suitable drug, i.e. 1 − m, the physicians’ choice
of prescription drugs is governed by detailing eﬀorts, implying an average mis-
match cost of t/2.T h u s ,T varies between t/4, which occurs when q → 0 or
Φ → 1,a n dt/2, which occurs when q → 1 or Φ → 0. We can now address the
questions posed at the beginning of the section, considering in turn the regimes
of price regulation and price competition.
5.1 Price regulation
We ﬁrstly consider the question of whether or not ﬁrms provide an eﬃcient
level of DTCA. Recognising from (9) that detailing can be implicitly deﬁned
25Since the market always is assumed to be covered, prices are just monetary transfers
involving no eﬃciency loss. This is due to the assumptions of unit demand and non-binding
reservation price v, which make total demand inelastic to prices.










The ﬁrst term represents the marginal gain of improved matching of drugs
to patients due to DTCA. The second term refers to impact of DTCA on
detailing, which we have shown is negative, with c measuring the magnitude
of this beneﬁt. Finally, the last term reﬂects the marginal social loss due to
higher expenditure on DTCA. The following can then be stated.
Lemma 1 Under price regulation, pharmaceutical ﬁrms provide a socially op-
timal level of DTCA only if p = t
2(1−c).I f p<(>) t
2(1−c) as u b - o p t i m a l( a n
excessive) level of DTCA occurs.





















[t − 2p(1 − c)].
Then it is easily veriﬁed that dW
dΦ |Φ=Φr ≥ 0 ⇔ p ≤ t
2(1−c).
The provision of DTCA by pharmaceutical ﬁrms may be excessive or sub-
optimal depending on the level of the regualted price. A more generous price
t e n d st oi n c r e a s et h eﬁrms’ spending on DTCA. From a social point of view,
this is beneﬁcial in that mismatch is reduced and the social waste of detailing
tends to be reduced through DTCA, but these beneﬁts are oﬀset by an increase
in the cost of DTCA.26 For any given price, over-investment in DTCA is then
the more likely the lower the degree of mismatch (t) and the lower the social
cost of detailing c.
While it could be argued that by setting the price appropriately, the regu-
lator could stimulate an optimal level of DTCA, this is likely to be impractical
when the regulator has to use the price in order to provide incentives to develop
the drug. The high R&D costs in the pharmaceutical industry may then imply
levels of the price for which DTCA advertising is excessive. Therefore, we may
consider whether or not the lifting of a ban on DTCA improves welfare. Here,
welfare under a ban of DTCA is given by
W |Φ=0 = v − T |Φ=0 − c · 2ϕ|Φ=0 . (21)
An obvious beneﬁt from prohibiting DTCA is the saving in ﬁrms’ expenditures
on this activity. This gain has to be balanced against the increase in mismatch-
ing costs and in spending on detailing. As there is scope for over-provision of
26Whether or not detailing is reduced depends on whether or not the direct and positive
eﬀect of price on detailing outweighs the negative impact of greater DTCA.
16DTCA, the question concerning a ban is then whether or not over-provision is
so strong as to lead to a drop in welfare below the status quo once DTCA is
allowed.
Proposition 3 Under price regulation, the availability of DTCA is socially
beneﬁcial (harmful) if and only if c>(<)
p−t
2p .
Proof. Under a ban on DTCA, welfare is obtained by inserting ϕr |Φ=0 =
p
q
4 into (21), yielding
W
r |Φ=0 = v −
t
4







When DTCA is allowed, welfare is obtained by inserting (8) and (9) into (18),
yielding
W



























Comparing (22) and (23), gives
W
r − W
r |Φ=0 = q
2p
t − p(1 − 2c)
16a
.
Then it is easily veriﬁed that Wr ≥ (<)Wr |Φ=0 ⇔ c ≥ (<)
p−t
2p .
Note that a ban of DTCA is justiﬁed only if c<1
2. Otherwise, the social
gain from reduced detailing justiﬁes the lifting of a ban alone even if the drugs
are perfect substitutes, i.e. even if t =0 . Further, this ﬁnding holds irrespective
of the level of price. Hence, if detailing is considered to be socially wasteful,
then it is always in the social interest to lift a ban on DTCA. Consider now c<
1
2, resembling a situation in which some social value is attached to detailing.
Here, the desirability of DTCA also depends on the regulated price and on
the substitutability between the two drugs. If price regulation is suﬃciently
tight, it is beneﬁcial to allow DTCA. Speciﬁcally, this is the case for all prices
below t, the price that would emerge under price competition when patients
are completely informed (Φ =1 )or physicians are completely unreceptive to
detailing (q =0 ) . If, however, if R&D incentives compel the regulator to grant
ah i g hp r i c et ot h eﬁrms, then the over-investment in DTCA is so strong as
to justify a ban. Such a situation is the more likely the better substitutes the
drugs are.
175.2 Price competition
Again, we start out with considering whether or not ﬁrms provide an eﬃcient
level of DTCA. As in the previous case, equilibrium detailing can implicitly be
deﬁned as a function of DTCA, implying that we can address the ﬁrst question




(1 − q + Ω)(3+q − Ω),
where 0 < b c(a,t,q) ≤ 1
2 for all q ∈ [0,1] and a ≥
qt
4 is easily veriﬁed. Then the
following holds.
Lemma 2 Under price competition, pharmaceutical ﬁrms provide excessive
levels of DTCA if and only if c<b c(a,t,q). Given c<1
2, this is satisﬁed
if t is suﬃciently high and/or a is suﬃciently low.
Proof. In the price competition regime, detailing can be expressed as a




4[1− q(1 − Φc)]
. (24)








4[1− q(1 − Φc)]
2 − 2aΦ
c.
Substituting into this expression 1 − q(1 − Φc)=1
2 (1 − q + Ω), as follows













(1 − q + Ω)
2 −
qt




|Φ=Φc ≥ 0 ⇔ c ≥
1
8
(1 − q + Ω)(3+q − Ω)= :b c(a,t,q).
It is easily veriﬁed that ∂b c
∂a < 0 and ∂b c
∂t > 0.N o t i n gt h a ta =
qt
4 ⇔ Ω =1+q,











When ﬁrms are allowed to set prices both under- and over-provision of
DTCA can arise. As one may expect, over-investment arises if (and only if)
t h es o c i a lc o s to fd e t a i l i n gc is suﬃciently low. More surprisingly, given c over-
investment arises if the products are poor substitutes, i.e. if t is high, and
18if the cost of advertising is low, i.e. if a is low. This ﬁnding is particularly
striking with respect to the substitutability. Poor substitutability implies a
high mismatch cost and, thus, signiﬁcant social gains to DTCA advertising.
H o w e v e r ,a tt h es a m et i m eﬁrms can set high prices when products are poor
substitutes. This boosts promotional activity to such extent that the cost
of DTCA outweighs its social gains. More generally, the divergence between
private and social beneﬁts from DTCA can be explained by three externalities.
A ﬁrm’s DTCA involves (i) a positive externality upon consumers through
lower mismatch, implying a tendency towards underinvestment, (ii) a negative
business stealing externality on its rivals, (iii) a negative social externality in
that one dollar saved on detailing, as valued by the ﬁrm corresponds to a social
beneﬁto fo n l yc dollars. As it turns out, the negative externalities of DTCA
tend to dominate for low values of c.W i t hr e g a r d t ot, the business stealing
externality tends to dominate the mismatching externality.
W ew o u l dl i k et op o i n to u tt h a tt h i sﬁnding is consistent with the received
literature. While Shapiro (1980) shows that a monopolist would always under-
provide informative advertising, extending the model to n ﬁrms Grossman and
Shapiro (1984) demonstrate that in most cases competition tends to induce
ﬁrms to over-provide informative advertising. The reason is that the wasteful
consumer-stealing eﬀect of DTCA tends to dominate the beneﬁcial matching
eﬀect as the number of competitors increase. This indicates that increased
competition should make over-provision more likely.
Let us now turn to the second question of whether DCTA is beneﬁcial from
a welfare point of view and should therefore be allowed, or whether a ban is
desirable. As before, the benchmark is the level of welfare under a ban on
DTCA, as given by (21). To establish the result, deﬁne now
b b c(a,t,q): =
1
4
(1 − q)(1+q − Ω),
where 0 ≤ b b c(a,t,q) ≤
(1−q)q
2 < b c(a,t,q) is readily checked. Then the following
can be stated.
Proposition 4 Under price competition, the availability of DTCA is socially
harmful if and only if c<b b c(a,t,q). Given c<
(1−q)q
2 , this is satisﬁed if t is
suﬃciently low and/or a is suﬃciently high.
Proof. Under a ban on DTCA, welfare is obtained by inserting ϕc |Φ=0 =
tq
4(1−q) into (21), yielding
W
c |Φ=0 = v −
t
4








19When DTCA is allowed, welfare is found by inserting (24) into (18), yielding
W
c = v −
t
4





















Substituting into this expression 1 − q(1 − Φc)=1
2 (1 − q + Ω), as follows















(1 − q)(1− q + Ω)
−
1





|Φ=Φc ≥ 0 ⇔ c ≥
(1 − q)(1+q − Ω)
4
=: b b c(a,t,q).
It is easily veriﬁed that ∂b b c
∂a > 0 and ∂b b c
∂t < 0.N o t i n gt h a tt
a =0⇐⇒ Ω =1− q,
it follows that b b c(∞,t,q)=b b c(a,0,q)=
(1−q)q
2 .
The desirability of DTCA depends on the social cost of detailing c. Ab a no f
DTCA is warranted if c is suﬃciently low. DTCA is more likely to be socially
harmful if the products are good substitutes, i.e. if t is low, and/or if the cost
of DTCA is high, i.e. if a is high. This is interesting in that in Lemma 2,
we have concluded that under those same circumstances (low t,h i g ha) over-
investment is less likely. Note that b b c(a,t,q) < b c(a,t,q) implies that DTCA is
only banned if it actually leads to over-investment.
The seeming contradiction can then be explained with reference to a dis-
crepancy in the marginal and absolute eﬀects of a and t. Over-investment arises
if the marginal cost of DTCA exceeds its marginal social value. As shown in
Lemma 2, this is the more likely the higher t and the lower a. But a higher
t and a lower a also imply that the absolute beneﬁt of DTCA is more likely
to outweigh its cost. Hence, poor (good) substitutability of drugs indicates
that while over-investment is likely (unlikely), its occurence does not justify
(justiﬁes) a ban.
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
This study has examined the eﬀects on competition and welfare of relaxing
the restrictions on DTCA of prescription drugs which are currently in place
20in many countries. Observing that pharmaceutical ﬁrms spend substantial
amounts of money on promoting drugs to physicians, we have focused our
analysis on the interaction between DTCA and detailing, where these market-
ing strategies aﬀect prescription choices. Although the model is stylised, we
believe the analysis provides some new insights into the debate on DTCA. Our
main ﬁndings are as follows: Firstly, ﬁrms respond to the opportunity of DTCA
by lowering their spendings on detailing. The reason is that DTCA reduces
the physician’s scope to prescribe promoted drugs at will, and, thereby, softens
detailing competition.
Secondly, whether or not DTCA is beneﬁcial to the ﬁrms’ depends cru-
cially on the regulatory regime. If prices are set by a Health Authority, the
availability of DTCA allows ﬁrms to curb the physician’s market power, and,
thereby, achieve savings in detailing outlays such that total promotional cost
falls. Firms, therefore, suﬀer from a ban on DTCA. If, in contrast, ﬁrms are
price setters, DTCA stiﬀens price competition and leads to a lower mark-up.
This is because DTCA increases the share of informed consumers and, thereby,
the price elasticity of demand. As it turns out, the reduction in mark-up leads
to lower proﬁts in the presence of DTCA although ﬁrms are able to reduce
total promotional cost. In this regard, ﬁrms beneﬁtf r o mab a no nD T C Ai f
price competition matters.
Finally, the social gains from DTCA amount to a better allocation (match-
ing) of pharmaceuticals across consumers and to a reduction in the social cost
of detailing. These gains are oﬀset by the industry cost of DTCA. Generally,
the welfare impact of DTCA is ambiguous. In both regimes instances of over-
and under-provision can arise depending on whether or not detailing is consid-
ered to be socially wasteful. Over-investment is particularly likely in instances
in which prices are high. Under price regulation this may be due to concerns
about R&D incentives; under price competition high prices are set if the drugs
are poor substitutes. While a ban may then be justiﬁed in the ﬁrst case, it is
usually not in the latter because poor substitutability of drugs is also associated
with high mismatch costs.
In conclusion, we should point at some of the more limiting assumptions we
have made. Firstly, in focusing on the matching issue rather than the problem
related to over-prescription of drugs, we have assumed that total demand is
not aﬀected by the promotional spending, which only shifts market shares. In
practice, promotional competition is also likely to increase the volume of pre-
scriptions. In this case, allowing ﬁrms to engage in DTCA is likely to increase
market coverage. The analysis by Grossman and Shapiro (1984) suggests that
this would not change a potential stiﬀening of price competition and the re-
sulting fall in proﬁt. The welfare eﬀect of DTCA would now also depend on
whether or not the expected health gain of an additional prescription exceeds
its total unit cost.
21Secondly, we have assumed a positive role of DTCA in that consumers who
have received the relevant ads always receive the appropriate drug. One concern
a b o u tD T C Ai st h a ti ti sp e r s u a s i v er a t h e rt h a ni n f o r m a t i v ea n dm a y ,t h u s ,
become itself a source of mismatch. When DTCA is only partially informative
some consumers relying on their own expertise in interpreting DTCA may pick
the wrong drug. The implications of this for the eﬀects of DTCA on price
competition and welfare remain to be explored.
References
[1] Butters, G., 1977. Equilibrium distributions of sale and advertising prices.
Review of Economic Studies 44(3), 465-491.
[2] Eckard, E.W. jr., 1991. Competition and the cigarette TV advertising ban.
Economic Inquiry 29(1), 119-133.
[3] Frank, R.G., Salkever, D.S., 1997. Generic entry and the pricing of phar-
maceuticals. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 6(1), 75-90.
[4] Grossman, G., Shapiro, C., 1984. Informative advertising with diﬀerenti-
ated products. Review of Economic Studies 51, 63-81.
[5] Hellerstein, J.K., 1998. The importance of the physician in the generic
versus trade-name prescription decision. Rand Journal of Economics 29(1),
108-136.
[6] Hillman, A., Samet D., 1987. Dissipation of contestable rents by small
numbers of contenders. Public Choice 54, 63-82.
[7] Hurwitz, M.A., Caves, R.E., 1988. Persuasion or information? Promotion
and shares of brand name and generic pharmaceuticals. Journal of Law
and Economics 31, 299-320.
[8] King, C. III, 1997. Marketing, product diﬀerentiation, and competition in
the market for antiulcer drugs. Harvard Business School, Working paper
01-014.
[9] Konrad, K., 2002. Competition for prescription drugs. Mimeo, Wis-
senschaftszentrum Berlin.
[10] Lipsky, M.S., Taylor C.A., 1997. The opinions and experiences of fam-
ily physicians regarding direct-to-consumer advertising. Journal of Family
Practice 45, 495-499.
[11] Lu, J.L., Comanor, W.S., 1998. Strategic pricing of new pharmaceuticals.
Review of Economics and Statistics 80, 108-118.
[12] Lundin, D., 2000. Moral Hazard in physician prescription behavior. Jour-
nal of Health Economics 19, 639-662.
[13] Mossialos, E., 1998, Regulating Expenditure on Medicines in European
Union Countries. In: Saltman, R.B., Figueras, J., Sakellarides C. (Eds.),
Critical Challenges for Health Care Reform in Europe. Open University
Press. Buckingham and Philadelphia. Chapter 11.
[14] Rizzo, J.A., 1999. Advertising and competition in the ethical pharmaceu-
22tical industry: The case of antihypertensive drugs. Journal of Law and
Economics 42(1), 89-116.
[15] Rosenthal, M.B., Berndt, E.R., Donohue, J.M., Frank, R.G., Epstein,
A.M., 2002. Promotion of prescription drugs to consumers. New England
Journal of Medicine 346(7), 498-504.
[16] Rubin, P.H., Schrag, J.L., 1999. Mitigating agency problems by advertis-
ing, with special reference to managed health care. Southern Economic
Journal 66(1), 39-60.
[17] Shapiro, C., 1980. Advertising and welfare. Comment. Bell Journal of
Economics 12(2), 749-751.
[18] Scherer, F.M., Ross, D., 1990. Industrial Market Structure and Economic
Performance. Houghton Miﬄin Company, Boston, Chapter 16.
[19] Scherer, F.M., 2000. The pharmaceutical industry. In: Cuyler, A.J., New-
house, J.P. (Eds.), Handbook of Health Economics. North Holland, Else-
v i e r ,A m s t e r d a m ,C h a p t e r2 5 .
[20] Schmalensee, R., 1976. A model of promotional competition in oligopoly.
Review of Economic Studies 43, 493-507.
[21] Schmalensee, R., 1992. Sunk costs and market structure, a review article.
Journal of Industrial Economics 40, 125-134.
[22] Schweitzer, S.O., 1997. Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy. Oxford
University Press, New York.
[23] Scott Morton, F.M., 2000. Barriers to entry, brand advertising, and generic
entry in the US pharmaceutical industry. Rand Journal of Economics
30(3), 421-440.
[24] Skaperdas, S., 1996. Contest success functions, Economic Theory 7, 283-
290.
[25] Tullock. G., 1980. Eﬃcient rent seeking. In: Buchanan, J.M., Tollison,
R.D., Tullock, G., (Eds.), Towards a Theory of Rent-seeking Society. Texas
A&M University Press, College Station, 97-112.
[26] Wilkes, M.S, Bell R.A., Kravitz R.L., 2000. Direct-to-consumer prescrip-
tion drug advertising: trends, impact and implications. Health Aﬀairs
(Millwood) 19(2), 110-128.
[27] Zweifel, P., Breyer, F., 1997. Health Economics, Oxford University Press,
New York.
23